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The Direct Reporting Program Manager (DRPM) for the United States Marine 
Corps Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) is conducting an analysis of two acquisition 
tactics concerning the commercial procurement of the MK-44 chain gun to be integrated 
with the EFV.  General Dynamics (GD) manufactures the EFV and the MK-44 is 
manufactured by Alliant Techsystems Inc. (ATK). The purpose of this thesis is to assist 
the DRPM in determining which of two tactics the Government should use for the 
procurement of the MK-44. The two alternatives for acquiring and integrating the MK-44 
are: 1) to procure the MK-44 as government furnished equipment (GFE), or 2) to procure 
the MK-44 as contractor furnished equipment (CFE). The fundamental difference is that 
a GFE arrangement will provide a direct contractual relationship between the 
Government and ATK, whereas, a CFE contract will eliminate that relationship as ATK 
will become a sub-contractor to GD, the prime contractor for the EFV. These two options 
present a variety of issues for analysis in determining which approach is most 
advantageous, with respect to cost and other risk, to the Government. 
The key findings of our research indicate the MK-44 is a favorable candidate for a 
CFE arrangement. This particular CFE arrangement will provide a value added service to 
the Government adequately justifying GD’s Profit Rate.  Additionally, a CFE 
arrangement allows the Government to reduce the overall program risk by transferring 
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The Direct Reporting Program Manager (DRPM) for the United States Marine 
Corps Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) is conducting an analysis of two acquisition 
tactics concerning the commercial procurement of the MK-44 chain gun to be integrated 
with the EFV.  General Dynamics (GD) manufactures the EFV and the MK-44 is 
manufactured by Alliant Techsystems Inc. (ATK). The purpose of this thesis is to assist 
the DRPM in determining which of two tactics the Government should use for the 
procurement of the MK-44. The two alternatives for acquiring and integrating the MK-44 
are: 1) to procure the MK-44 as government furnished equipment (GFE), or 2) to procure 
the MK-44 as contractor furnished equipment (CFE). The fundamental difference is that 
a GFE arrangement will provide a direct contractual relationship between the 
Government and ATK, whereas, a CFE contract will eliminate that relationship as ATK 
will become a sub-contractor to GD, the prime contractor for the EFV. These two options 
present a variety of issues, both tangible and intangible, for analysis in determining which 
approach is most advantageous, with respect to cost and other risk, to the Government. 
B. PURPOSE 
 The primary objective of this thesis is to examine what decisions and types of 
analysis should be made when confronted with a multiple contractor acquisition and 
integration issue such as GFE versus CFE.  This paper will conduct an analysis and apply 
it to the MK-44 procurement decision faced by EFV Program Office.   A secondary 
objective is to educate and create a document of lessons learned that will help future 
Program Managers (PM) to better analyze the correct approach to deciding whether to 
purchase GFE or CFE. 
C. SCOPE 
 This thesis seeks to comprehensively analyze the cost and risk factors relevant 
and pertinent to contract procurements involving a GFE or CFE decision.  Additionally, 
this thesis aims to identify and examine cost aspects particular to a DoD acquisition PM 
that are difficult and challenging to estimate.  The cost aspects are absolutely necessary 
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for an equitable comparison of government furnished services or goods to contractor 
furnished services or goods.  Finally, this thesis will indicate specific conditions that most 
often predicate a GFE or CFE arrangement.  The scope of this thesis will focus on 
identification and analysis of all relevant cost drivers.  In the event that cost does not 
elicit a clear decision and the decision hinges on one or more acquisition risk areas 
presented in this thesis, a recommendation will be made for further research in that 
particular risk area.  
D. METHODOLOGY 
 This thesis will explore the concepts highlighted in the Scope paragraph by 
conducting an in-depth analysis of the USMC EFV Program Office's options for 
procuring the MK-44 from ATK and integrating it with the EFV being manufactured by 
GD.  This analysis will be based on literature research from books, theses, journal articles 
and several internet resources. Interviews with personnel from the EFV Program Office, 
ATK and GD will be sourced.  Interviews with past and present program managers of the 
US Army’s Apache program and the Joint Strike Fighter program will also be conducted. 
All relevant and supportable cost drivers will be analyzed and interpreted.  To the extent 
possible, cost ranges will be established to portions of GD and ATK’s cost structure 
subject to changes over time due to market or economic conditions.  Additionally, all 
identified risk aspects will be discussed and evaluated for appropriate analysis. 
Acquisition risk areas associated with this analysis will be validated by the EFV Program 
Office with agreed level of importance for all risk factors.  
E.   RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
Primary:  
1. Is the procurement and integration of the MK-44 more advantageous to 
the Government under a GFE or CFE arrangement? 
Secondary:  
1. What cost drivers are critical to an equitable comparison between a GFE 
and CFE arrangement? 
2. What risk factors are critical to a GFE or CFE analysis? 
3. What acquisition, market or economic conditions cause one arrangement 
to be preferred to the other? 
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4. What are the possible methods of analyzing intangible considerations 
relevant to a GFE or CFE decision? 
F. ORGANIZATION 
 Chapter II contains a background of the EFV and development of the Direct 
Reporting Program Office. The reason for selecting the MK-44 will follow with a 
description of the two methods to procure the MK-44, GFE and CFE. 
 Chapter III will explore the cost issue. This chapter will introduce cost items and 
follow with the history of the cost elements in the EFV program. This will be preceded 
by a break down of the costs of the MK-44 by fiscal year. This will be analyzed along 
with an interpretation of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) A-76 outsourcing 
program and how this relates to what the government is trying to accomplish.  
 Chapter IV explores and discusses issues that are associated with the three main 
elements of risk. This chapter will begin by describing the risks associated with cost 
followed by performance and schedule. Each element of risk will be analyzed as GFE 
and CFE. This chapter will conclude with the identification of which arrangement will 
contain the greatest amount of risk. 
 Chapter V will discuss lessons learned from current day programs that may be 
applied to the programmatic tactics, techniques and procedures to help bring awareness 
of current successes and failures. This will also provide a reference for future programs to 
learn from. 
 Chapter VI will summarize the findings of this report, answer the research 
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II. HISTORY OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE 
A. BACKGROUND 
National Security Strategy has shifted from a focus on global threat to a 
focus on regional challenges and opportunities. While the prospect of 
global war has receded, we are entering a period of enormous uncertainty 
in regions critical to our national interests. Our forces can help to shape 
the future in ways favorable to our interests by underpinning our alliances, 
precluding threats, and helping to preserve the strategic position we won 
with the end of the Cold War. Naval Forces will be full participants in the 
principal elements of this strategy – strategic deterrence and defense, 
forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitiution. (Ref. 4) 
Our National Security Strategy requires a strong forcible entry capability; the 
USMC provides this forcible entry capability with the EFV, formerly called the 
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV).  Title 10 of the US Code directs the 
USMC to develop the necessary means to achieve victory in amphibious operations. The 
USMC solution to this problem was the Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV), which has 
served the USMC for over thirty years.  
The USMC identified deficiencies in their current AAV, in the Mission Need 
Statement 176970, dated 19 August 1988. The deficiencies were due in part to the age of 
the current AAV and the continuing advancements in non-Soviet fielded threat 
technologies. From this Mission Needs Statement and the Operational Requirements 
Document (ORD), the USMC embarked on the EFV. The EFV is the USMC’s primary 
means of accomplishing surface power projection and, if necessary, forcible entry against 
any level of defended coastline. The EFV is a self-deploying, high-water-speed, armored 
amphibious vehicle capable of seamlessly transporting Marines from ships located over 
the horizon to inland objectives. The EFV will allow the USN and the USMC to link 
maneuver at sea and maneuver ashore in all types of amphibious operations, including 
those employing the Operational Maneuver from the Sea concept. (Ref. 26) 
The EFV is fully armored and capable of carrying up to seventeen combat loaded 
Marines. The EFV is able to use oceans, rivers, lakes, and seas as avenues of approach  
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and maneuver for the landing forces. The EFV has two variants; the personnel variant 
and the command variant. The EFV is currently half way through the system 
development and demonstration phase. (Ref. 2) 
 The greatest benefit of the EFV is the speed with which it is able to cover land 
and water distances. The EFV is able to move at thirty knots in calm water. The EFV is 
equipped with a powerful 2,700 HP diesel engine. The EFV is able to attain land speeds 
of up to 45 mph, allowing it to keep up with the M1A1 Abrams main battle tank. The 
lack of land speed capability is the primary detractor of the AAV as it is unable to keep 
up with the M1A1 tanks. With all these benefits, the price tag is also impressive, at 
around seven million dollars apiece. (Ref. 2)  
The EFV is able to fight day or night with the help of the second generation FLIR 
system. There is also a laser range finder to aid the targeting process. The EFV has also 
been upgraded with the ability to fight within a Nuclear, Biological or Chemical 
environment.  
B. DIRECT REPORTING PROGRAM MANAGER 
 In June of 1996, the USMC awarded the Demonstration/Validation phase contract 
to develop a single EFV prototype to GD. This began the EFV acquisition program and 
was responsible for establishing an innovative first for an acquisition program office. 
 The contract was awarded to GD with the stipulation that the EFV Technology 
Center be located within twenty miles of the Pentagon and the USMC Combat 
Development Command in Quantico, Virginia. GD located the building in Woodbridge, 
Virginia. This new building was designed to hold GD's entire EFV production workforce 
and all EFV government employees.  This was not only a first for the USMC, but also a 
first for the DoD acquisition community. This co-location allowed aggressive use of the 
Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD) concepts. This also allowed for 
better communication, lower travel costs and better program oversight on Total 
Ownership Cost (TOC). 
 In addition, the location of the EFV center allowed the program office to use 
Marines, from the Operating Forces, Marine Schools, and Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command. These Marines provided insights to improve the design of the 
EFV during its development stage. The program office incorporated these Marines into 
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the Integrated Product Teams, where the Marines shared their knowledge and experience 
on issues such as maintenance and operation of the AAV's in a field environment. This 
will help ensure the same mistakes are not carried over to the EFV. (Ref. 26) 
This co-location has been integral in developing the EFV and has been a 
tremendous asset in establishing precedence for future DoD acquisition programs. This 
combined team has inspired the USMC and GD to create the very best in the next 
generation EFV for the Marines to continue to accomplish the mission of tomorrow. 
Included below is the EFV program schedule as of November 2003.  
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Figure 1.   EFV Program Schedule (From:  Ref. 26) 
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C. USMC SELECTS THE MK-44 
The EFV program originally started in the mid 1970s, but several cancellations 
and restarts delayed further action until the late 1980s.  The program was finally 
approved and a Program Management Office was mandated for EFV concept 
development and exploration in June 1990.  There were originally two contractors; GD 
and United Defense Limited Partnership were employed during the concept exploration 
phase. Following the Milestone A decision in March of 1995, GD was awarded a Cost-
Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF) contract in June 1996 to develop the EFV prototype.  
 The USMC set the lethality threshold for the EFV’s main gun to destroy, 
neutralize, or suppress antitank weapons, light armored vehicles, emplacements / 
bunkers, and dismounted infantry. The maximum effective range of the main gun was 
specified to be 1500 meters. (Ref. 4) The Medium Caliber Armament Study (MCAS) was 
conducted to determine the right gun for the USMC. The results of this study persuaded 
the USMC to go with the MK-44 Gun System, manufactured by ATK.  
The USMC chose this weapon system because it had the highest kills per stowed 
load lethality (Super 40), second lowest system weight, super 40 growth potential and 
permitted the “train in 30 fight in 40 concept”. The MK-44 presently can fire 30mm 
ammunition; however, after changing the barrel and some feed sprockets, the MK-44 is 
able to fire super 40mm ammunition, hence the train in 30 fight in 40 motto. The MK-44 
is capable of firing APFSDS-T (Tungsten Long Rod), HEI-T/MPLD, TP/TP-T, and 
SAPHE-T rounds. With the MK-44's ability to fulfill the USMC criteria for lethality, the 
array of potential ammunition, and upgradeability to 40mm ammunition, the USMC has 
officially selected the MK-44 Gun System for the EFV.  
 The MK-44 actually refers to the physical gun itself. When the gun is placed in 
the turret of the EFV, it is referred to as the MK-46 Gun System. The MK-46 uses the 
same Army fire control system that is on the M1A1 Abram’s main battle tank. This 
provides the stabilization needed for the EFV to fire while on the move over land or 
water. There is also a coaxial 7.62mm M240 machine gun located in the MK-46. (Ref. 2) 
 ATK is a major U.S. aerospace and defense contractor with sales of 
approximately $2.2 billion. ATK has strong positions in propulsion, composite structures, 
munitions, precision capabilities, and civilian and sporting ammunition. It is the nation’s 
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leading manufacturer of ammunition and world’s leading supplier of solid propulsion 
systems. (Ref. 5) ATK was originally a part of Honeywell; however, ATK was spun off 
in 1990. ATK has made many acquisitions since that time to increase its presence in the 
US market. One such acquisition was in 2002 when ATK bought Boeing’s ordnance 
business, which merged ATK’s munitions portfolio with the nation’s leading gun 
producer.   
The MK-44 was procured for the System Development and Design Phase from 
ATK as GFE.  The acquisition strategy for the EFV Program Office has identified the 
MK-44 as an exception to the overall strategy of keeping Government Furnished Property 
to a minimum.  (Ref. 29) However, in keeping with the strategy the DRPM has decided 
to ensure the EFV program makes a calculated and competent decision between 
competing tactics, GFE or CFE.   
The period of time from the original ATK/MK-44 contract to the present day GD 
contract for EFV LRIP and FRP has been tremendously unstable with regards to military 
actions, economic conditions and DoD acquisition reforms.  Consequently, the DRPM, as 
a manager of public funds, has to re-evaluate a direct contract (GFE arrangement) with 
ATK for the MK-44 against the potential of a CFE arrangement with GD. With the cost 
environment of government contractors constantly changing, decisions made two or three 
years ago may not be in the best interest of the government today. This thesis analyzes 
how cost drivers have changed over time and what methods are available to take full 
advantage of those changes. This will also bring into view when one type of arrangement 
is more advantageous over the other.  
D. GFE AND CFE DEFINITION 
1. Government Furnished Equipment 
GFE is defined in Section 45.101 of the FAR as: “Government property means all 
property owned by or leased to the Government or acquired by the Government under the 
terms of the contract. It includes both Government furnished property and contractor-
acquired property.” (Ref. 6) There are implied risks that the Government will bear with 
this type of arrangement. When the Government provides equipment to a prime 
contractor, the Government is now in a position where they will be responsible for how 
this equipment integrates into the system. If the system does not meet the performance 
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requirements established, the contractors can blame the Government’s equipment as the 
cause of this performance degradation. The Government also now takes on the risk of 
ensuring that the equipment is delivered on time to the prime contractor in order to allow 
the contractor to maintain their established production schedule. Thus the Government 
now takes on additional schedule risk. Thus when the Government decides to go with a 
GFE arrangement there are additional risks that the Government inherently takes on. 
2. Contractor Furnished Equipment 
CFE is defined in Section 45.101 of the FAR as: “Contractor-acquired property 
means property acquired or otherwise provided by the contractor for performing a 
contract and to which the Government has title.” (Ref. 6) With a CFE arrangement the 
Government will place all the risk on the contractor by having the contractor responsible 
for all aspects of the equipment being procured. The contractor is willing to do this for a 
fee, which is charged to the Government. The contractor, in agreeing to this, will take on 
all risks to include cost, schedule, and performance risks associated with this 
arrangement.  
3. CFE versus GFE Demonstrated 
The two concepts above, as defined by the FAR, can be illustrated by examining 
one of many system acquisitions.  As an example, a DoD acquisition Program Manager is 
responsible for the procurement of the next generation military transport truck.  The 
prime contractor would be selected from a pool of competitors; in this example OshKosh 
is selected.  The Program Manager, as well as OshKosh, understands that several major 
components will come from original equipment manufacturers (OEM) other than 
OshKosh.  Specifically for the truck, the engine and transmission could potentially come 
from different OEMs (i.e., Cummings) and OshKosh would simply integrate that item 
into the production process of the truck.   
The Program Manager has a decision to make concerning the method by which 
the Government supplies the engine and/or transmission to OshKosh.  The two methods 
are CFE or GFE.  As stipulated by the definition above, the CFE arrangement places all 
aspects of responsibility associated with procurement and integration with the prime 
contractor.  In this case, OshKosh would have the sole responsibility to procure and 
integrate the CFE item and manage a sub-contractor.  
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Conversely, with a GFE arrangement, the PM retains the responsibility of 
procuring and coordinating the integration of the GFE item with the principle end item.  
In this case, the PM will have two separate contracts, one with the prime contractor and 
another with the OEM of the GFE item, the sub-contractor under a CFE arrangement.  In 
most cases, a GFE arrangement does not imply that the Program Manager or Government 
takes possession of the GFE item.  Instead, the Program Manager coordinates 
performance and delivery schedules and pays the prime contractor a fee to accept, handle 
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III. COST 
A. INTRODUCTION/COST DRIVER IDENTIFICATION 
Current acquisition methodology dictates the use of Cost As an Independent 
Variable (CAIV) when analyzing procurement options.  This analysis is no different.  
The focus is going to be on the elements of cost associated with the MK-44 procurement 
under both a GFE and CFE arrangement.  The first category of cost drivers is those costs 
associated with a GFE arrangement. The second category of cost drivers is those costs 
associated with a CFE arrangement.  The costs associated with both alternatives are 
quantifiable.  However, two costs associated with a GFE arrangement, opportunity cost 
and overhead cost, are unsupportable and outside the scope of this thesis.  The key to a 
reliable explanatory cost analysis is obtaining accurate data for quantifiable cost 
elements, as well as developing reasonable proxies for the unsupportable cost elements.  
1. Identification of GFE Cost Drivers  
The first set of cost drivers to be identified with a GFE arrangement is opportunity 
cost, Government overhead rates, unit price, and GD’s burden rate.  The first of four cost 
drivers is the Government’s cost associated with a GFE arrangement for the procurement 
and integration of the MK-44.  As a result of a direct contractual relationship with ATK, 
under a GFE arrangement, the Government will incur labor costs for contract 
administration and contractor management duties associated with that contract.  The 
Government labor cost is quantifiable and should be included in a cost comparison of 
GFE and CFE.  However, the Government labor cost, in this instance, is unsupportable 
due to manpower and funding constraints.  Available funding does not allow for hiring 
additional personnel.  Therefore, current EFV program personnel would execute the 
contract administration and management tasks associated with a MK-44 contract as 
collateral duties.  Fundamentally, a GFE arrangement would incorporate, at least on the 
surface, huge savings because the labor costs are a sunk cost - the personnel assigned to 
the EFV Program Office would receive their wages and benefits regardless of whether 
the MK-44 contract with ATK exists or not.   
  14
However, there is a cost associated with the work a Government employee is not 
able to perform as a result of completing tasks associated with an ATK/MK-44 contract.  
This cost is identified as the opportunity cost of a GFE arrangement.  Developing an 
estimate for this opportunity cost is paramount to deriving a reasonably acceptable cost 
figure for the Government's labor efforts under a GFE arrangement.  Without an estimate 
for Government labor costs associated with a GFE arrangement, the savings identified 
under a GFE versus a CFE arrangement will be inflated and unrealistic. 
The EFV Program Office conducted a preliminary labor survey in October, 2002, 
that led to an estimate of 9,000 man-hours per year for administration and management of 
the MK-44 contract under a GFE arrangement.  By assimilating the data from the survey 
to determine ranks of personnel (predominantly civilian) associated with specific man-
hours and utilizing salary rates for various ranks provided by the Naval Center for Cost 
Analysis, which includes fringe benefits but does not include indirect labor costs and 
facility costs, a reasonable Government labor cost estimate is possible. (Ref. 8)  Realizing 
the need for this cost element, the EFV Program Office is currently conducting a follow-
up business case analysis to determine a valid and reasonable estimate for the opportunity 
cost of Government labor associated with a GFE arrangement. 
The second of four cost drivers under a GFE arrangement is the standard 
Government overhead rate of 12 percent. The overhead rate is quantifiable, but 
unsupportable, as the Program Office has not conducted an analysis to determine the 
validity of the regulatory rate.  Additionally, tracking all costs associated with just the 
MK-44 would be inefficient and impossible for allocation purposes required for typical 
overhead calculations.  The current OMB A-76 studies will provide some background for 
this cost element. 
The OMB Circular A-76 and its supplemental handbook provide policy guidance 
and implementation procedures for Government agencies to use in deciding whether to 
contract out for commercial goods, services, and activities. OMB updated this handbook 
in 1983 and again in March 1996.  OMB’s revised A-76 supplemental handbook 
established or changed several standard cost factors and included the requirement that 
Government overhead costs be calculated by using a standard rate of 12 percent of direct 
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labor costs.  This provided a standard Government overhead rate to use for cost estimates 
much like those being analyzed in this thesis.  The latest revision was intended to reduce 
the administrative burden of performing A-76 Studies and to make cost comparisons 
between private sector proposals and Government estimates more equitable.  This “best 
value” private sector offer is then compared to the Government’s in-house proposal. (Ref 
23) 
The fundamental decision to be made by the EFV Program Office is whether the 
Government will benefit more from acting as the buyer of the MK-44 or from 
outsourcing the procurement of the MK-44 to GD.  In this light, the A-76 mandated 
overhead rate of 12 percent warrants inclusion as a Government cost factor to accurately 
compare a GFE (in-house) arrangement to a CFE (outsource) arrangement. 
However, validating the 12 percent overhead rate, in the context of the EFV 
program, is a challenging prospect requiring additional data.  Included in this figure are 
other costs associated with managing the MK-44 contract, to include travel, employee 
benefits and the cost associated with the infrastructure needed to allow these employees 
to work. The primary difficulty and one that renders this cost element unsupportable for a 
GFE arrangement is quantifying the administrative and community costs incurred by 
current EFV Program Office personnel in a GFE arrangement.  The EFV Program Office 
is currently developing validation criteria to establish an accurate overhead rate in 
accordance with the guidance from Circular A-76. 
The third of four cost drivers associated with a GFE arrangement is the unit price 
charged by ATK for each MK-44 chain gun.  ATK is in the process of establishing a 
catalogue price for the MK-44.  This potentially indicates that the MK-44 unit cost from 
ATK should be the same, regardless of buyer.  The catalogue price has not been 
determined and the Government has not issued a Request For Proposal (RFP) at this time. 
A unit cost analysis provides insight concerning the ability of either entity, the 
Government or GD, to negotiate a lower unit cost from ATK.  Variation in negotiated 
unit cost will have a direct impact on a CFE versus GFE decision.   
The ability to negotiate a more favorable unit cost leads to a discussion of 
Economies of Scale (EOS).  EOS occur when the volume of procurement reaches a price 
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break level offered by the contractor resulting in a lower per unit cost.  Both the 
Government and GD have the potential to negotiate an EOS price break in the event 
another program, such as the USN LPD-17, adds to the EFV's MK-44 requirement for the 
Government (GFE) or GD is placed under contract by another program with a 
requirement for the MK-44 (CFE).  The EOS analysis is difficult to assimilate due to the 
inability to predict other program requirements or contractor actions.  This thesis will 
consider this an issue for the EFV Program Office to consider during market research and 
RFP preparation. 
The EOS discussion, from a thesis perspective, will tend to favor GD and a CFE 
arrangement.  The EFV Program Office is not the Program Manager for medium caliber 
weapons for the USMC, nor is there any funding in the EFV’s program to provide for the 
additional duties this would require. GD, on the other hand, has the resources and 
industry clout to become involved with other military programs that require the use of the 
MK-44. A good example is the US Army’s new Future Combat System (FCS) line of 
vehicles where GD is the prime contractor on half of FCS vehicles.  GD could possibly 
have a comparative advantage to negotiate a high volume price break (EOS) for the MK-
44 requirement.      
The potential for Direct Commercial Sales adds to the comparative advantage of 
GD to attain EOS.  This type of sale allows GD to commercially sell the MK-46 Gun 
System (nomenclature after MK-44 is integrated with a turret) to any friendly allied 
nation of the US Government.  Interest in procuring the MK-46 Gun System has been 
expressed by Belgium, Czech Republic, South Korea, and Great Britain.  Between the 
interested countries, potential sales represent approximately 2,600 MK-46 systems.  Of 
note, GD could not provide additional data, only that interest has been expressed by the 
previously mentioned countries.  This issue is a viable cost consideration and should be 
addressed during contract discussions and negotiation under a CFE arrangement. (Ref 23) 
The fourth and final cost driver associated with a GFE arrangement is GD’s 
Burden Rate, which is the rate GD will charge the Government to receive, store and 
manage the MK-44 until integration with the EFV is complete.  The GD Burden Rate is a 
percentage of the MK-44 unit cost (the unit cost derived from the contract established 
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between the Government and ATK) for each MK-44 received and integrated by GD, as 
stipulated in the contract between the Government and GD.  The GD Burden Rate is 
designed to cover GD’s costs associated with physically receiving, handling and storing a 
Government owned item, the MK-44.   
2. Identification of CFE Cost Drivers 
The second set of cost drivers to be identified is unit price, GD’s profit rate, and 
GD’s General and Administrative Expense Rate (G&AEx). The first of three cost drivers 
is the unit price charged by ATK for each MK-44 chain gun.  As stipulated in the last 
section, we believe GD has a greater potential for obtaining a lower unit cost (price) from 
ATK based on the potential EOS attained through additional government contracts 
requiring the MK-44 and/or through Direct Commercial Sales of the MK-46 System.  
The second of three cost drivers associated with a CFE arrangement is GD’s 
profit rate, which is the rate GD will charge the Government to procure and integrate the 
MK-44, while managing ATK as a subcontractor.  The GD Profit Rate is a percentage of 
the MK-44 unit cost (the unit cost derived from the sub-contract established between GD 
and ATK) for each MK-44 procured and integrated with the EFV by GD, as stipulated in 
the prime contract between the Government and GD.    
GD’s Profit Rate is the single cost driver with the greatest impact on the total cost 
of a CFE arrangement.  The Profit Rate represents GD’s desired increase to their bottom 
line for each iterative MK-44 integration process.  From the Government’s perspective, 
GD’s Profit Rate must be justified and off-set by a service provided by GD as the Prime 
Contractor.  GD’s service will be comprised of, mostly, activities associated with 
managing the subcontractor (ATK).  Those activities include, but are not limited to, 
successful integration of the MK-44, proactive management of configuration and 
integration issues and documentation and timely resolution of technical design and/or 
performance issues.  The stability and history of GD’s Profit Rate figures are discussed 
later in this chapter.  The ability of the Government to justify GD’s Profit Rate is 
discussed later in this chapter through discussions of paying a risk insurance premium.  
Additionally, Chapter VI discusses the necessity of assigning value-added to the services  
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provided by GD under a CFE arrangement.  A comparison of GD’s Profit Rate dollar 
value and the value-added estimate provide additional metrics for justifying or deterring a 
CFE arrangement.   
The third and final cost driver associated with a CFE arrangement is G&AEx, 
which is the rate GD will charge the Government to cover general and administrative 
expenses associated with managing the contract with ATK.  GD’s G&AEx Rate is a 
percentage of the MK-44 unit cost (the unit cost derived from the sub-contract 
established between GD and ATK) for each MK-44 procured and integrated with the 
EFV by GD, as stipulated in the prime contract between the Government and GD. 
B. HISTORY AND COMPARISON OF COST DRIVERS 
 To this point we have identified the relevant cost drivers associated with a cost 
analysis of the two alternatives for procuring and integrating the MK-44 with EFV.  We 
proceed with a discussion of the variability and/or stability of the quantifiable cost drivers 
previously identified for GFE and CFE arrangements.  This discussion does not include 
the GFE cost drivers determined to be unsupportable in the previous section.  
1. History of GFE Cost Drivers  
 The first of two quantifiable cost drivers associated with a GFE arrangement is 
the unit price charged by ATK for each MK-44 chain gun.  The unit price of a MK-44, 
based on historical and estimated projections, has a range of values. Data provided by the 
EFV Program Office from 2000 to 2004 indicates a MK-44 unit price range of $151,750 
(2000) to $182,884 (2004).  Interviews with EFV Program Office personnel established 
the most current unit price as adequate for the cost analysis.  However, several comments 
from the interviews indicated a plausible level of uncertainty with ATK’s pricing of the 
MK-44 for different buyers.  The contracting process is not at a point of discussions or 
negotiations to clarify ATK’s pricing strategy.  Given that a decision to proceed with a 
GFE or CFE arrangement will be made prior to contract negotiations, the most recent unit 
price estimate from 2004 is suitable for the cost analysis of both a CFE and GFE 
arrangement.  
The second and final quantifiable cost driver associated with a GFE arrangement 
is GD’s Burden Rate, which is the rate GD will charge the Government, as a percentage 
of the MK-44 unit price, to receive, store and manage each MK-44 until integration with 
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the EFV is complete.  The EFV Program Office procured and integrated the MK-44 with 
a GFE arrangement in 2000 for the System Design and Development phase of the EFV.  
At the time GD’s Burden Rate for a GFE item was 8%.   
Since March 2000, GD has reduced their burden rate for a GFE item having a unit 
cost greater than $100,000 from 8% to 2%.  The available history of GD’s Burden Rate 
for a GFE item with a unit cost greater than $100,000 has varied from a high of 12% to a 
low of 2%.  (Ref 24)  The EFV Program Office is satisfied that GD’s Burden Rate is 
stable at a current low of 2%.  
 
Table 1.   GFE Arrangement Costs 
 
GFE Arrangement 
MK-44 Unit Price $182,884 
GD’s Burden Rate 2 % 
Total Cost per MK-44 $186,541 
 
2. History of CFE Cost Drivers 
The first of three quantifiable cost drivers associated with a CFE arrangement is 
the unit price charged by ATK for each MK-44.  As stated in the previous section, our 
research has determined the most recent unit price estimate available from the EFV 
Program Office will suffice for both GFE and CFE cost analyses and that MK-44 unit 
price is $182,884. 
The second of three quantifiable cost drivers associated with a CFE arrangement 
is GD’s Profit Rate.  GD’s Profit Rate is negotiated at the time of contract discussions 
and negotiations.  However, GD’s Profit Rate has remained stable at 14% during the last 
four years.  This number has been used for budget planning and there is no certainty that 
GD’s Profit Rate will remain at 14%.  However, given a CFE arrangement is pursued, it 
remains unknown whether a lower profit rate or higher profit rate will be negotiated.   
The third and final quantifiable cost driver associated with a CFE arrangement is 
GD’s G&AEx Rate. GD’s G&AEx Rate is a percentage of the MK-44 unit cost (the unit 
cost derived from the sub-contract established between GD and ATK) for each MK-44  
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procured and integrated with the EFV by GD, as stipulated in the prime contract between 
the Government and GD.  GD’s G&AEx Rate is 2%.  This rate has remained stable over 
the history of our research (See Appendix B).   
 
Table 2.   CFE Arrangement Costs 
 
CFE Arrangement 
MK-44 Unit Price $182,884 
GD’s Profit Rate 14 % 
GD’s G&AEx Rate   2 % 
Total Cost per MK-44 $212,145 
 
For additional data on the history of all relevant cost drivers, see Appendix A. 
3. Comparison of GFE versus CFE Total Costs  
From Tables 1 and 2 and based on the stability of both GD’s Burden Rate, under a 
GFE arrangement, and GD’s G&AEx Rate, under a CFE arrangement, the cost driver 
responsible for the $25,604 difference is GD’s Profit Rate under a CFE arrangement. 
Already explored is the possibility of the Government and GD negotiating different unit 
costs for the MK-44.  To demonstrate the impact of negotiating a lower GD Profit Rate, 
we have held the MK-44 unit cost constant, under both scenarios, at a level dictated by 
the most recent data.  The fundamental comparison of the two alternatives is focused on 
what GD’s Profit Rate represents to the Government and does that representation justify 
the $25,604 increase in cost per MK-44.  We provide two theories for articulating GD’s 
Profit Rate from the Government’s perspective.   
Both theories take risk management into consideration.  The first theory is the 
idea that the Government is paying an insurance premium to cover potential risks 
associated procuring and integrating the MK-44 with the EFV.  The Government paying 
an insurance premium against unknown future risk events is similar to the rationalization 
used by automobile owners when buying automobile insurance.  Assuming an automobile 
owner has a clean driving record and is 45 years old, the insurance premium they pay 
depends on the amount of coverage they want in the event of an accident or theft.  
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Additionally, the premium will be dictated by the type of vehicle and safety features; a 
Mustang Cobra with no airbags or alarm system will result in a much higher insurance 
premium then an Aerostar minivan with front and side airbags. 
The theory behind the automobile insurance premium is the theory of risk 
assessment. The insurance premium is a risk premium based on the nature of the 
unknown future event. With automobile insurance, the degree to which the owner is risk 
adverse will determine the amount of coverage. The more risk adverse the owner is the 
greater their desired coverage, the higher the premium they are willing to pay. 
Furthermore, the type of vehicle and safety features will determine the level of impact 
(high speed, fatalities, damages) an unknown future event could have. The insurance 
premium to cover the risk of injury and damages will be greater for a 2005 Mustang 
Cobra than for a 1996 Aerostar Minivan. The likelihood of the unknown future event 
occurring is the identical, however the probability of that event occurring is much 
different.  
This risk theory is directly related to the CFE versus GFE analysis.  GD’s Profit 
Rate, regardless of the actual number, represents a risk premium similar to the 
automobile insurance premium. The Government is similar to the auto owner, where GD 
would be considered comparable to the insurance company. The Government must 
quantify the level of ‘coverage’ they want from GD by way of services to perform. This 
level will then have to be negotiated with GD who will also determine a level that will 
allow them to mitigate the risk that they will take over with the CFE arrangement and still 
make a profit. GD will do this by ensuring ATK is managed as a subcontractor and that 
the MK-44 is integrated with the EFV, regardless of the occurrence of future events that 
could affect cost, schedule or performance issues. 
The second theory developed for articulating the Government’s representation of 
GD’s Profit Rate is assessing the value-added by GD under a CFE arrangement.  By 
doing this assessment, the Government will not pay more than the value-added. 
Fundamentally, this assessment must be completed to discourage GD from charging a 
risk premium that is greater then the services they will provide.  The value-added concept 
is discussed further in Chapter VI.  
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Our research indicates that the likelihood of an unknown event occurring is 
identical with both arrangements. Therefore, the analysis hinges on first, the type and 
impact of risk associated with GD’s integration and management processes and their 
ability to resolve integration issues in a timely manner (value-added).  And secondly, the 
Government’s level of risk aversion must be considered; what risk premium is the 
Government willing to pay?  
The bar charts below demonstrate the difference between what the Government 
would pay for the MK-44 as GFE compared to the risk premium paid under CFE. The 
charts below do not take into consideration the opportunity cost associated with a GFE 
arrangement or the value-added that GD provides with a CFE arrangement.  
When looking at the charts there is also no consideration of unit price discounts 
due to EOS and Learning Curve Theory. These two items need to be looked at further as 
these could affect the price of the total contract. In addition to these two factors, the EFV 
Program Office will not be buying all the Mk-44s at one time. This is also an issue that 
could affect the price of the Mk-44 over the life of the contract. The analysis of how this 
could affect the price is outside the scope of this project.   
 To better understand the insurance premium concept, the tables below contain the 
procurement of the MK-44 broken down by fiscal year. Underneath the fiscal year is the 
actual quantity of MK-44’s the Government plans on buying. The charts have a range of 
13 percent to 15 percent, the reasoning for this is to allow the EFV Program Office to 
conduct scenario analyses and determine the effect the profit rate will have on the overall 
contract. With the profit rate being negotiable, the Government is in a position where 
they will be able to affect the overall price of the contract. The Contracting Officer will 
need to be proactive and aggressive in trying to negotiate a lower profit rate from GD.  
 It is important to note that the dollar figures in the charts have not been 
discounted back and are being used with FY ‘04’ dollars. When the CFE cost is broken 
down it comes out to roughly $25,000 per gun. The highest the Government will pay is in 
FY 12 when they will buy 111 MK-44s, this will equal a CFE premium of $2,775,000 for 
the year. These numbers are just the difference in price and do not show the opportunity 
cost and additional risk GD will assume from the Government. The $25,604, which was 
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the difference between a GFE and CFE purchase price, therefore does not necessarily 
represent a savings in price. This represents the difference between the cost of a GFE 
versus CFE arrangement without including the unsupportable aspects related to the 
opportunity and overhead costs associated with a GFE arrangement. The EFV office will 
have to subjectively assign a value to these issues in order to analyze what the true 
difference will be between CFE and GFE. 
 
Table 3.   Cost Comparison at 13% 
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Table 4.   Cost Comparison at 14% 
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Table 5.   Cost Comparison at 15% 
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C. COST CONTEXT 
 In determining the context of the MK-44 purchase with the overall price of the 
EFV, we aim to demonstrate the relationship of this purchase to the overall system 
acquisition cost. Although the total unit cost of an EFV is not known, for the purpose of 
this paper the figure $8.5 million will be used as a benchmark. With this being the total 
cost per EFV, the MK-44 purchase will be approximately 2% of the total cost for each 
EFV under a GFE arrangement. Additionally, the CFE premium will add a .3% increase 
in program acquisition costs per EFV. This .3% increase represents the quantifiable value 
that the Government must compare to the additional services provided by GD under a 
CFE arrangement. (Ref Appendix C, out-brief to Program Office) 
D. CONCLUSION 
 Throughout this chapter there were three main items that were covered with 
respect to cost, they were the changing nature of the cost data, the premium which the 
CFE will require, and cost in relation to the program.  
 This chapter highlights the issues surrounding the constantly changing cost data. 
The EFV program management team must be proactive to assimilate the cost data within 
a fast paced program. The changing cost data puts additional pressure on the management 
team to make an informed decision in the best interest of the Government.  
 This paper has referred to the CFE cost as a risk premium that the Government 
will be charged for services provided by GD. This premium is negotiable with GD and 
the charts demonstrate various outcomes assisting the Program Office in their 
determination of when the premium will be in the best interest of the Government.  
 When looking at the cost of the MK-44 in relation to the purchase price of one 
EFV and the total life of the program it allows one to examine the overall effect of the 
MK-44 purchase. This will allow one to examine the entire cost compared to the program 
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IV. RISK MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS 
A.  EFV ACQUISITION PROGRAM RISK DEFINED 
Risk is defined as the chance of not achieving the results as planned.  Risk is “the 
probability or likelihood of failing to achieve a particular outcome” and “the consequence 
or impact of failing to achieve that outcome.”  Two elements of an event’s occurrence, 
the probability and impact, determine the level of risk and, accordingly, the resources 
(manpower and funding) required for mitigating, transferring or avoiding the risk. (Ref 
26) 
This chapter will analyze several areas of risk associated with the EFV Program 
Office decision to proceed with a GFE or CFE arrangement for procuring and integrating 
of the MK-44 during Full Rate Production (FRP).  In this particular situation, the GFE 
versus CFE decision will be based, partly, on the degree to which the risk associated with 
a GFE decision to manage the MK-44 procurement and integration mitigated, avoided or 
transferred to the prime contractor (GD) under a CFE arrangement.  
Fundamental to the risk analysis are the areas of risk related to program cost, 
schedule, performance, configuration and integration. Each risk area will be broadly 
identified in the following paragraphs and associated with the MK-44 as a component of 
the EFV.  This chapter will then discuss the risk management tactics of risk mitigation, 
risk transfer and risk avoidance with an analysis of the options available to the EFV 
Program Office to implement these tactics under each arrangement.   
Program cost risk is the ability of the Program Office to achieve the EFV 
acquisition cost objectives without experiencing cost overrun.  This includes the effects 
of budget and affordability decisions, such as the GFE versus CFE, and the effects of 
inherent errors in the cost estimating techniques used, such as the cost estimations of the 
Government labor and overhead requirement under a GFE arrangement.  Additionally, 
the MK-44 represents only 2% of the EFV’s acquisition unit cost and the estimated CFE 
premium represents .3% of the EFV’s unit cost.  Therefore, the probability of the MK-44 
GFE or CFE decision, in and of itself, resulting in a program cost overrun situation is 
minimal.  However, in the context of this thesis and to adequately assess the options for 
  28
the EFV Program Office concerning cost issues with respect to the GFE versus CFE 
decision, the increased cost of a CFE decision must be analyzed.  Chapter three provides 
the details of this cost analysis.  What that cost increase represents is paramount to an 
effective cost-benefit analysis.  The cost increase can be considered an “insurance 
premium” (discussed in Chapter III) against certain risk areas defined below and, 
accordingly, the probability and impact of those risks occurring.  Or the cost difference 
can be assessed as a “value-added fee”, for the additional efforts of GD as the chief 
integrator, to mitigate and avoid certain risk areas.  Either way, the goal of the EFV 
Program Office is to get the best possible EFV while minimizing program risk at the 
lowest cost and that includes the cost of the MK-44 procurement and integration.   
A GFE arrangement would inherently require additional labor hours, manpower 
and various other administrative actions, i.e., travel to ATK, direct meetings with ATK, 
and contract oversight with ATK and GD.  Although these add-ons have associated costs, 
the EFV Program Office considers this particular cost comparison a wash because even 
with a CFE arrangement, the government will still, to a certain extent, be the whole 
system coordinator and integrator, to include the MK-44.  This position is reiterated in 
the lessons learned chapter through an interview with the JSF program (Ref 27).  
Program schedule risk for a high profile acquisition is always difficult to manage 
within the often schedule driven acquisition process.  The EFV exemplifies the attention 
an ACAT ID program schedule slip will garner.  Fundamentally, with a GFE 
arrangement between ATK and the Government for the MK-44, the Government is acting 
as the middle-man and coordinating two contract schedules to ensure production and 
delivery of the MK-44 coincides with the production of the EFV at GD.  Complications 
in either production schedule will require government coordination efforts with both 
contractors to ensure production is not halted or inventories are not built up resulting in 
additional transportation or storage costs.  A GFE arrangement increases the risk to the 
Government and places it in the position of ensuring form, fit and function responsibility 
for the MK-44 to minimize any schedule complications and cost increases.  
MK-44 performance risk is significantly more important under a GFE 
arrangement. In this case, if the MK-44 is furnished to the prime contractor (GD) in a 
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condition that is not suitable for the intended use, the Government assumes liability and 
would be forced to correct the problem through modification or redesign coordination 
with ATK.  This could prove to be costly, technically challenging and could definitely 
impact the program’s schedule.  (Ref 26)   
For example, a small manufacturing glitch by ATK, causing the MK-44 to not 
have a proper fit with the EFV turret mechanism, constitutes performance risk that must 
be corrected by the Government under the GFE arrangement.  This particular occurrence 
will lead to the increased probability of occurrence in other risk areas, such as schedule 
delays and cost increases, while the Government initiates actions to cure the glitch.  
Under a CFE arrangement, the prime contractor has the responsibility to manage ATK as 
a subcontractor.  GD would assume all schedule and cost risk associated with a missed 
performance specification. (Ref 23)   
Configuration and integration risk is the area of greatest concern.  The MK-44 
must be integrated with the EFV’s turret before it can be considered the operational 
weapon system of the EFV.  Therefore, the slightest variance with respect to form, fit and 
function of the MK-44 could have disastrous results as GD attempts to integrate it with 
the turret.  If the Government decides to execute a GFE arrangement, the EFV Program 
Office will be responsible for the system integration risk management plan requiring 
dedicated resources in the form of technical design expertise to assist with coordinating 
corrective action. Regardless of the effectiveness of the system integration risk 
management plan, a GFE arrangement, by way of time and manpower resources required 
to resolve the integration problem, will result in higher costs than a CFE arrangement. 
Configuration management risks are obvious.  Any modification, additional 
capability or re-engineering completed on the MK-44 will have to be fully vetted with the 
EFV’s turret system to ensure form, fit and function. With a GFE arrangement, 
configuration management resolutions, when two different contractors are involved, can  
lead to escalating costs and extremely lengthy processes when the modification may, in 
fact be time sensitive due to mission criticality.  The resource burden, similar to 
integration risk, will be on the Government. 
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Intangible aspects of risk are not quantifiable, but do merit discussion with respect 
to what could be lost with a CFE arrangement and must be evaluated by the EFV 
Program Office to determine their relevance to this analysis.  Although the associated risk 
with a GFE arrangement is disconcerting to a typical PM, being able to have a direct 
contractual relationship or privity of contract with the two contractors, as would be the 
case with a GFE arrangement, does provide a certain degree of schedule management and 
acquisition control.  A GFE arrangement would allow the Government to exercise direct 
contract administration over ATK and GD, thus increasing the PM’s insight and 
knowledge into contract and program progress and potentially improving the likelihood 
of overall program success.  Additionally, the technical risk of the MK-44 is relatively 
low with respect to the EFV as a whole system.  The greatest concern is not whether the 
MK-44 will technically perform, but how mush risk is associated with the integration 
process controlled by GD.  This point is highlighted in the lessons learned chapter 
through interviews with the JSF program.  (Ref 27)  
If the government should decide to execute a CFE arrangement, ATK will 
become a sub-contractor of GD. Due to the government’s privity of contract, GD will 
control all communication with ATK. The effect of this will cancel a very beneficial 
relationship with ATK, who has provided the government with ammunition and other 
technical advice since the initial purchase of the MK-44. (Ref. 30) 
Additionally, the EFV Program Office must assess the differences between a CFE 
and GFE arrangement with respect to the contract management effort required under a 
GFE arrangement compared to the capabilities and workload of current EFV Program 
Office personnel.  This assessment falls outside the scope of this thesis; however, the 
subjectivity of the topic lends itself to consideration by the Program Office and staff. 
B.   EFV PROGRAM RISK MANAGEMENT  
There are several tactics available to the EFV Program Office to manage the risks 
associated with both arrangements.  The tactics considered fall into three categories: risk 
mitigation, risk transfer and risk avoidance.     
Risk mitigation is the process that “identifies, evaluates, selects and implements 
options in order to set objectives.”  Risk mitigation includes determining what should be 
done to manage a particular risk, how often it should be done and reported, who is 
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responsible for handling it and what the cost impact of managing the risk is.  PM’s must 
determine the possible “consequences of action or inaction as well as conducting a cost-
benefit analysis of mitigation actions.” (Ref 29)  
A CFE decision by the EFV Program Office will result in a single higher cost 
contract to procure and integrate the MK-44 with the EFV.  The risk mitigation process 
demands that there be value-added by GD’s integration process to justify the additional 
cost.  If there is no value-added, the additional cost becomes a pass-through fee and fails 
to provide a metric for assessing risk mitigation. Additionally, a CFE arrangement 
assigns the duties of risk management to GD and, with appropriate contract language, can 
be assessed by the Government over the performance of the contract. 
A GFE decision by the EFV Program Office results in two contracts, one with the 
prime contractor (GD) and another with ATK.  A portion of the risk accepted by the 
Government under a GFE arrangement can be mitigated through contract language and 
contractual conditions, such as an Associate Contractor Agreement (ACA).  The Marine 
Corps and Navy have successfully implemented a risk mitigation plan in conjunction 
with a GFE buy for the F-18 E/F program. The engines for the F-18 were procured under 
GFE through General Electric in Lynn, Massachusetts.  The program office mitigated the 
risks described earlier by using an ACA, which allowed the prime contractor (Boeing) to 
go and talk directly to General Electric. This cut the government out of the picture and 
enabled better communication and faster response time.  
However, the ACA arrangement was made possible by the government 
establishing a Defense Contract Field Management Office at GE manned by an 
administrative contracting officer and placing a program integrator at the GE plant.   
(Ref. 28) 
Risk avoidance constitutes the Program Manager choosing one alternative over 
another alternative based on the lower level of risk, thereby reducing the risk.  However, 
this does not eliminate the risk.  An important distinction to make is that risk avoidance is 
a conscious decision to choose lower versus higher risk options.  Avoiding risk by 
ignoring its presence and potential impact is an unacceptable solution.  The schedule risk 
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associated with potential integration, configuration and design issues becomes the 
responsibility of the prime contractor under a CFE arrangement.   
The EFV Program Office can implement risk avoidance by utilizing a CFE 
arrangement.  The MK-44 CFE arrangement inherently contains less risk for the 
Government than a GFE arrangement.  As indicated, the primary MK-44 risk area is 
integration and configuration with the EFV turret.  GD has a robust resource pool to 
manage and control integration and configuration risk within the EFV production 
process.  By incorporating GD as chief integrator and sub-contractor manager under a 
CFE arrangement, the Government will choose the lower risk option.   
Risk transfer involves more than one entity sharing risk.  This technique is often 
used between the Government and contractors.  The Government may provide financial 
incentives to a prime contractor to minimize or reduce risks in numerous risk areas, to 
include system integration, performance and adherence to the program schedule.  This is 
accomplished through financial incentives (award fees, contractual incentives).  An 
award fee provision associated with successful subcontract management would provide 
an entry point for overseeing the subcontract management function since that insight 
would be required to adequately assess subcontract management as part of the award fee 
process.  Regardless of arrangement, the idea of sharing risk (in general) is pervasive 
throughout DoD.  The government is accepting a portion of the risk by allowing the 
contractor to increase their profits through performance awards.  The key to the 
government’s ability to enforce schedule and cost constraints is to incentivize the 
contractor’s performance to increase their profit. 
 The Government’s contract with GD may include incentives that emphasize 
successful performance as chief integrator and configuration manager.  The 
Government’s primary means of influencing the degree to which a CFE arrangement 
reduces their risk exposure is through proactive contract language that holds GD, as the 
prime contractor, responsible and accountable for potential integration and configuration 
issues.  Additionally, under a CFE arrangement GD may be incentivized by rewarding 
effective subcontractor management. The proactive contract language, combined with 
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financial incentives, will allow the Government to adequately transfer and share the 
program risk associated with a CFE arrangement.   
 Another method of risk transfer available to the EFV Program Office, under a 
GFE arrangement, is the Integrated Product Team (IPT) Management technique 
referenced in the JSF program interview. (Ref 27)  The IPT Management structure would 
assign GD the leadership role of the IPTs associated with the MK-44 component of the 
EFV.  This assignment ensures GD has knowledge of day-to-day issues involving the 
MK-44 performance, integration and configuration.  With this knowledge, GD, under a 
GFE arrangement, will be more proactive and diligent in managing risk issues as they 
arise.   
 The flip side of the IPT Management technique is the potential of the Government 
relinquishing greater control to GD by assigning GD personnel as IPT leads.  The 
Government is able to reduce this potential problem by assigning IPT members with 
appropriate knowledge and experience to ensure a GD led IPT doesn't evolve into a run 
away train.   
Additionally, and probably more difficult, the Government should assign IPT 
members who will provide consistent and reliable input to the IPT and feedback to the 
Government.  The Government, to manage the risk associated with a GFE arrangement, 
should avoid managing the MK-44 procurement and integration "by committee".  EFV 
Program Office personnel roles should be clearly defined under a GFE arrangement, vice 
a collateral duty for the "most available" individual.     
C. CONCLUSION 
 The EFV Program Office's risk management plan will be extensive and should be 
well thought out with respect to those intangible areas identified in this chapter.  The 
subjectivity of the intangible areas makes their relevance and importance undeterminable 
for this analysis.  However, based on the remaining criteria for determining an effective 
risk management plan, a CFE arrangement will provide the lowest risk option with the 
greatest flexibility to proactively mitigate and reduce the occurrence and impact of 
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V. LESSONS LEARNED FROM MAJOR DOD PROGRAMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter provides insights from various DoD programs that have successfully, 
thus far, analyzed the GFE and CFE arrangements for procurement and integration 
decisions. The first program is the US Army Aviation Command’s (USAAC) Apache 
Block III program. The Apache’s 30MM chain gun is also manufactured by ATK and has 
been integrated under a CFE arrangement with the prime contractor, Boeing Corporation. 
The second program will be the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The key parallel between the 
JSF program and this thesis is how they procure and integrate the engine. Although the 
physical comparison of an aircraft engine to the MK-44 is not completely accurate, the 
thought processes and determining factors of the program office making the ultimate 
decision to incorporate a GFE arrangement for the aircraft engine is germane to our 
analysis of the MK-44 procurement.  
B. APACHE BLOCK III PROGRAM 
 An interview with Lieutenant Colonel Vince Tobin, the PM of the Apache Block 
III upgrade for the USAAC Apache Longbow Attack Helicopter highlighted multiple 
aspects of an effective GFE versus CFE analysis that proved valuable to this thesis. The 
opportunity was also presented to interview the Senior PM for Boeing Corporation (the 
prime contractor), Mr. Robert Kelly, to gain insight for our analysis from a prime 
contractor’s perspective. 
1. Apache Block III and a GFE Arrangement 
 The most difficult aspect of a GFE/CFE analysis, from the author’s perspective, is  
assessing the risk associated with each arrangement and quantifying that risk as a cost or 
schedule driver. This task is difficult simply due to the unique considerations of the 
Government (non-profit) arena discussed in Chapter IV. LTC Tobin described the task of 
translating risk into a measurable cost driver as absolutely necessary for an adequate 
comparison of the two arrangements. The reasoning behind deriving a cost driver 
associated with various types of program risk is straight forward; with a GFE 
arrangement the entire burden of risk management for schedule, performance, and 
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configuration management among other risks associated with the MK-44 rests solely with 
the Government. LTC Tobin illustrated with an example from the Apache’s Inertial 
Navigation System. This system, originally procured and integrated under a GFE 
arrangement, was applied to the Apache Longbow under the prime contractor, Boeing 
Corporation. According to LTC Tobin, whenever there was a problem with a software 
load on the Apache Longbow during testing, Boeing initially held the GFE (Inertial 
Navigation System) responsible for the software failure. As a result of the GFE 
arrangement, the initial claim by Boeing required the Government engineers to refute the 
claim through additional research and testing at a tremendous cost in both program time 
and funding. This process of fault determination, vice problem solving, created friction 
between the Government and the contractor increasing the risk of both cost and schedule 
overrun.  
 Lesson Learned:  A GFE decision by the Government requires a systematic plan 
to mitigate the potential risks associated with this arrangement. The Government must 
have the engineering and personnel support necessary to refute false claims of faulty GFE 
performance or resolve true claims of faulty GFE performance. Both situations will add 
to the task of managing and mitigating schedule risk, while the former will have an 
additional impact on budget risk. LTC Tobin noted an interesting question, “It may be 
cheaper to acquire the product GFE but is it cheaper in the long run when the weapon 
system comes out the door, maintaining it and taking care of it?” (Ref 20)  
2. Apache Block III and a CFE Arrangement 
 The Apache Block III program decided to procure and integrate the 30MM gun as 
CFE. This particular decision provided real world benefits to combat forces during Desert 
Storm. The US Army had a requirement to increase the fuel capacity of the Apache to 
provide greater range and loiter time. The decision was made to replace a portion of the 
ammunition storage with greater gas tank capacity. Due to the sensitivity of aircraft 
weight shifts and balance, implementing this engineering change proposal was a 
significant undertaking. The CFE arrangement facilitated the successful modification in a 
time critical, real world scenario. The Government only had to work with Boeing; Boeing 
had the engineering support, control of all past configuration efforts, owned all past 
design specifications and utilized ATK as a sub-contractor.  
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 Lesson Learned:  In today’s world of uncertainty and changing requirements for 
military capability, a CFE arrangement provides additional flexibility when the 
improbable requirement is time sensitive and mission critical. The Government must take 
this into consideration as they analyze a decision to implement a CFE or GFE 
arrangement. A CFE arrangement has the potential to develop multiple solutions at a 
lower cost and under a constrained timetable.  
3. CFE Negative Implications 
 LTC Tobin provided a fair and balanced assessment of a CFE arrangement in that 
this arrangement is not the perfect answer. An issue of concern is that Boeing, under the 
CFE arrangement, owns the system, including the 30MM gun. Consequently, the US 
Army must get a Justification and Approval for a sole source to Boeing whenever they 
have a modification or change proposal on the system. This can give the contractor 
leverage knowing that the Government has to go to them; this can create a tendency for 
the contractor to be expensive. There is value added in CFE, the Government needs to 
hold the contractor responsible for ensuring the system operates properly in this 
environment.   
4. Configuration and Communication Control 
 The Apache Longbow 30MM gun CFE arrangement has resulted in a significant 
issue concerning configuration control for the program office. Configuration control of 
the 30MM gun was contracted to Boeing as part of the primary contract.  
The US Army unilaterally modified the 30MM gun on the Block I Apache. Those 
Block I Apaches are scheduled for the Block III upgrade by Boeing. The unilateral 
modifications are not proprietary to Boeing, therefore, the 30MM gun configuration 
Boeing expects to receive for the Block III upgrade is different from the modified 30MM 
gun configuration that is actually on the Apache. Contractually, Boeing is the 
configuration control manager and will only apply the Block III upgrade to their 30MM 
gun configuration. Consequently, Boeing will have to strip the modified 30MM gun to 
the original Boeing configuration to apply the Block III upgrade. Boeing will charge all 
costs associated with this effort to the Government and require additional time to 
complete the Block III upgrade.  
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The Government’s desire to have the unilateral modifications integrated with the 
Apache Longbow during the Block III upgrade is agreeable with Boeing. But it will come 
at a cost in both time and funding to update all engineering and configuration 
management documents.   
 Lesson Learned: If the Government decides to designate the contractor as the 
configuration manager it must be aware that modifications and configuration updates 
must be implemented by the contractor and additional funding might be required for 
future situations. Furthermore, designating the contractor as the configuration manager 
authorizes the contractor to veto the Government on decisions concerning the CFE. For 
example, Boeing is now in a position to veto the Government’s request to update and 
modify the configuration by saying they are not able to engineer that particular 
equipment or are not capable of integrating that feature. This needs to be identified as a 
potential Government issue with a CFE arrangement. 
5. Sub-Contractor Management 
 According to Mr. Kelly, communication between Boeing and ATK has been 
positive and, with Boeing’s ability to effectively manage ATK as a sub-contractor, the 
above issue has been resolved. Because ATK is now a Boeing sub-contractor, there have 
been no issues with this situation. Of note, Boeing had previously owned ATK and those 
established relationships provide some explanation for the “very positive working 
relationship” that currently exists between Boeing and ATK. LTC Tobin concurred that 
the US Army had not encountered any problems with ATK being a sub-contractor to 
Boeing. In fact, LTC Tobin indicated that Boeing is far better staffed and equipped than 
the Government to manage ATK. He noted that contractors are able to take advantage of 
Enterprise Resource Planning systems and other tools of this nature.  
6. Apache Conclusion 
The question was asked if LTC Tobin had to do it all over again how would he 
purchase the gun. He responded that he would use CFE again. He stated he had no 
analysis to back this up but he felt that, most of the time, the benefits of CFE outweigh 
the costs. The risks that are incurred with GFE that are not easily identifiable need to be 
considered. He also stated that if the Government makes the decision to use GFE they  
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need to keep their eyes open because the burden is on the Government. This burden 
includes the extra engineering and the additional oversight required to manage situations. 
(Refs. 20 and 21) 
C. JSF PROGRAM 
 The interview with Stony MacAdams, the Propulsion Acquisition Manager for the 
JSF over the past four years, provided experience oriented insights for an effective GFE 
versus CFE analysis.  The JSF Program Office has a GFE arrangement with Pratt Witney 
and GE/Rolls Royce to provide the JSF engine to Lockheed Martin, the prime contractor 
for the JSF. 
1. JSF Program Maintains “System” View 
 The JSF program procures the engine through a GFE arrangement with the 
“engine guys” (PW and GE). The engine is provided to the “plane guys” (LHM) for 
integration.  Mr. MacAdams used these terms to establish the idea that under a CFE 
arrangement, and in situations requiring modifications or configuration changes as a 
result of operational testing and evaluation, the “plane guys” may not have a system 
approach to assessing subject modifications.  For instance, if the JSF had reported power 
issues during take-off, the “plane guys” could simply present the power issue to the 
“engine guys” (transferring the risk) with direction to fix the engine when engine output 
is already maximized. The more prudent approach to a perceived power issue would be to 
assess the entire system.  This would include determining if weight distribution is 
incorrect or the aircraft weight is outside of specifications due to ordnance or fuel load. 
There may be other factors contributing to a perceived power issue that may have system 
implications.   
Mr. MacAdams’ point is that the program office is the entity with a true “system” 
view of the JSF and a GFE arrangement with the “engine guys” will prevent the prime 
contractor or “plane guys” from making decisions without the benefit of a whole system 
analysis. Additionally, the JSF engine is a key subsystem representing a high level of 
technical risk and a majority of program cost, warranting the GFE arrangement. 
Lesson Learned: The continuing increase in the complexity of acquisition 
programs guarantees a PM will have to work with multiple large contractors to provide 
the desired product at the end of the acquisition process.  The PM must evaluate the 
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inherent risk and scope of a particular subsystem. The PM must then determine whether 
that subsystem should be procured with a GFE or CFE arrangement depending on several 
variables, one of which is the PM’s ability to effectively manage the whole system 
through the acquisition cycle.   
2. JSF Program Integrated Product Team (IPT) Management Structure 
Mr. MacAdams provided some insights concerning the negative perception of 
GFE arrangements within the program office.  To combat this perception he ceased using 
the term GFE and addressed the arrangement as an IPT Management Structure.  Within 
this structure, each subsystem has an IPT and LHM or the prime contractor has the IPT 
lead in all cases, regardless of GFE or CFE status.  This reinforces the contractual 
requirement that LHM perform duties as primary integrator responsible for all subsystem 
interfaces and performance.  The IPT structure ensures that the prime contractor or their 
representative is involved with day-to-day subsystem issues.  This structure mitigates the 
risk that prime contractors will claim non-performance against a GFE subsystem 
contractor.  The prime contractor is aware of all integration, configuration and 
performance issues through the IPTs. 
Lesson Learned: The government has the ability to delegate and empower the 
prime contractor as the chief integrator of all subsystems. This can be accomplished 
whether a subsystem is procured with a GFE or CFE arrangement, with the CFE 
arrangement making this delegation more automatic and less reliant on effective contract 
language and administration. Using IPTs is already the norm for most program offices. 
However, ensuring the prime contractor has the lead on all IPTs is more the exception.  
With a succinct, detailed and appropriately incentivized contract, the prime 
contractor/chief integrator should request the lead position on all IPTs.   
3. JSF Program and GFE vs CFE 
Mr. MacAdams provided the perspective of a seasoned acquisition professional 
concerning when he would utilize a CFE arrangement.  According to Mr. MacAdams, 
“Do CFE when there is value added by them (the prime contractor) doing the work.”  The 
government is going to pay a premium to the prime contractor under a CFE arrangement 
regardless of subsystem or contractor.  According to MacAdams, that premium should be 
considered a fee for value added performance.  If there is no value added resulting from 
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the CFE arrangement, the government is paying the prime contractor pass through fees or 
non-value added costs.  The idea of transferring risk to the prime contractor is incorrect.  
First, a solid contract is more than capable of ensuring a level of risk mitigation is 
established from the beginning.  Secondly, government acquisition professionals operate 
in a predominantly cost-reimbursement contract environment.  This ensures the 
government accepts the risk of schedule slips and cost overruns regardless of CFE or 
GFE arrangements.  
When asked about using a GFE arrangement, MacAdams indicated that when 
DoD has the manpower base and infrastructure to support a particular subsystem 
development and production, along with a history of such performance, a GFE 
arrangement makes the most sense.  In this case, MacAdams is referring to the jet aircraft 
engine technical and design expertise resident in DoD along with a long history of 
successful engine programs.  
Lesson Learned: The government must identify and quantify the value added 
that offsets the premium required by a prime contractor under a CFE arrangement.  If 
there is no value added by the prime contractor, the PM will be hard pressed to justify 
paying a premium for the CFE arrangement.  Additionally, the PM must be aware of the 
type of contract instrument and contract language being used to determine the actual risk 
a CFE arrangement would transfer from the government to the prime contractor. 
The PM must be aware of internal technical, design and support expertise 
available for a particular subsystem.  The PM must determine if that expertise is adequate 
for the GFE arrangement.  The PM should review available history on similar subsystem 

































 The primary objective of this thesis was to examine what decisions and types of 
analysis should be made when confronted with a multiple contractor acquisition and 
integration issue such as GFE versus CFE.  The secondary objective was to educate and 
create a document of lessons learned that will help future Program Managers (PM) be 
able to better analyze the correct approach to deciding whether to purchase GFE or CFE.  
 The research effort began with a background of the EFV program and the history 
behind the program. The next item of discussion was the effect of cost on the decision 
making process with a GFE or CFE arrangement. The cost analysis was followed by how 
an effective and proactive risk management plan would impact the decision. The final 
discussion point aimed at gaining insight from current acquisition programs to include the 
US Army Apache program and the Joint Strike Fighter Program. The conclusions from 
this research are contained below. 
B.  CONCLUSION 
The primary research question focuses on whether the procurement and 
integration of the MK-44 is more advantageous to the Government under a GFE or CFE 
arrangement?  
In the end, the cost-benefit analysis for the EFV Program Office will be a 
comparison between the GD “insurance premium” (in addition to contract performance 
incentives) equal to the MK-44 cost increase under a CFE arrangement versus the benefit 
or value-added by GD as the prime contractor under a CFE arrangement.  Fundamentally, 
the government must have value-added to the EFV acquisition process to justify paying 
GD a 14% premium to manage ATK as a subcontractor. 
One of our secondary research questions aimed at determining if there are certain 
characteristics of a component or subsystem that would inherently lead a PM to execute a 
CFE or GFE arrangement.  From our discussions with other DoD Acquisition Program 
Officials experienced in utilizing both types of arrangements, we have developed five 
fundamental characteristics that will objectively lead to either a CFE or GFE 
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arrangement.  Not developed are the more subjective issues a PM must account for in 
making this decision – reflecting that DoD acquisition is more of an art than a science. 
 The first characteristic is the level of technical risk associated with the subsystem 
or component.  The lower the technical risk, the less likely that a PM would feel the need 
to be directly involved with the design, development or production.  This is particularly 
true of a commercial item as opposed to a government developmental item.  In this case, 
the hands-off approach would facilitate a CFE arrangement.  The opposite holds when a 
component or subsystem with a high level of technical risk demands a more hands-on 
approach by the PM, particularly if the component or subsystem holds the majority of the 
“program’s” technical risk.  In this case, the PM will lean towards a GFE arrangement to 
ensure that appropriate awareness and risk management efforts are executed. The MK-44 
falls in the low technical risk category that should lend it to the CFE arraignment. 
 The second characteristic is the cost of the component or subsystem, as a 
proportion of total program cost.  The lower the unit cost, the less effort required on the 
part of the PM to manage and control the cost.  Additionally, a CFE arrangement 
increases the cost for the component or subsystem.  The lower the original unit cost, the 
lower the cost increase for a CFE arrangement.  The PM will be able to justify the 
additional cost of a CFE arrangement with greater conviction.  The higher the unit cost, 
the harder it is to justify the cost increase for a CFE arrangement. The MK-44 lends itself 
to a CFE arrangement with a component acquisition cost of just 2% of the EFV unit cost 
and a predictable CFE premium equal to .3% of the EFV unit cost. 
The third characteristic is the maturity of the contractor and its production 
processes.  The more reliable, consistent and mature a contractor's production processes 
for a particular item, the more likely that item is to be considered for a CFE arrangement.  
If there are unresolved issues or inconsistencies with an unproven product or contractor, 
the PM will most likely insist on a direct relationship with the contractor to ensure 
positive control and risk management.  The EFV Program Office considers ATK’s MK-
44 production capability to be a mature process resulting in a reliable product.   
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Additionally, our research interview with the Apache Program Office indicated ATK 
received favorable remarks as a mature, responsive subcontractor.  Therefore, the MK-44 
acquisition would be best suited to a CFE arrangement. 
 The fourth characteristic is whether the particular item is sole sourced or 
competed.  A competed item may allow the Government to negotiate a lower cost 
contract under a GFE arrangement, while a sole source item will be contracted at the 
same cost regardless of whether there is a CFE or GFE arrangement assuming the 
Government and Prime Contractor have similar bargaining powers.  The exception to this 
is the ability of one party (Government or prime contractor) to achieve economies of 
scale (EOS) through a high volume procurement.  This determination would hinge on the 
probability of one party or the other being able to garner such EOS.  Unless such 
arrangements already exist and are advertised, this assessment is difficult for two reasons.  
First, it demands looking into the future, a perspective not common in the DoD 
acquisition community.  Second, this assessment depends on knowing the business plans 
of two commercial organizations operating for profit.  Determining the ability of one 
company to achieve EOS and the degree to which another will allow EOS is difficult and 
unreliable.  Barring particular arrangements identifying EOS one way or the other, a sole 
sourced item is not a reasonable factor for determining which arrangement will be more 
favorable in every instance.  The MK-44 is a sole sourced item, however, according to 
EFV Program Office personnel, there is uncertainty underlying the assignment of a unit 
price under a CFE arrangement.  In this instance, the Government is not clear that this 
particular sole sourced item will have a similar unit price under the two arrangements.  
 The fifth characteristic is determining whether there is value-added as a result of a 
CFE arrangement.  This determination depends on how the item in question is viewed 
relative to the whole system.  Given the first four characteristics are identified in a 
particular item, i.e. the item is sole sourced, has a low level of technical risk with a low 
cost share relative to the whole system and the contractor/item is proven with a mature, 
reliable production process, in order to utilize CFE arrangement, the prime contractor 
must provide value-added processes to offset the additional cost.  More often than not, 
the value-added processes will come from the prime contractor's function as chief 
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integrator.  The prime contractor's ability to consistently and flawlessly integrate the 
potential CFE item with the whole system will determine the value-added.  The key to the 
value-added determination is the extent to which a particular item requires considerable 
integration processes and encompasses a high degree of integration risk.  
For example, a potential CFE item may require assembly with two bolts and nuts 
tightened to a specific torque. That situation would encompass little risk with few 
processes and would be difficult to determine a value-added commensurate with the 
additional cost of the CFE arrangement.  However, if the item has more detailed 
assembly processes or software integration processes requiring minimal variation and 
encompassing a higher degree of integration risk, the value-added by the prime contractor 
implementing positive control over integration will be worth the additional cost of a CFE 
arrangement. The MK-44’s current integration falls near the center of a integration 
complexity scale with multiple software interfaces on one end of the spectrum and the 
previously mentioned bolt and nut integration on the other end of the spectrum.  The 
caveat for the MK-44, making the value-added processes more beneficial and in-line with 
the CFE premium, is the potential for future interoperable and upgradeable capabilities.   
 There are also the subjective considerations that must be evaluated by the 
program office. The last contact with the Program Office indicated that these subjective 
areas are currently being evaluated.  Their intent is to subsume what we have developed 
quantifiably and incorporate their findings to produce a business case analysis for the 
EFV Program Office.  
 The key findings of our research indicate the MK-44 procurement and integration 
processes should be executed under a CFE arrangement for two primary reasons.  First, 
GD is capable of and, as the prime contractor and chief integrator, will provide value-
added processes commensurate with providing the Government a reliable EFV.  
Secondly, an evaluation of a potential risk management plan indicates the Government 
will be selecting the lower risk option, with respect to the procurement and integration of 
the MK-44, by incorporating a CFE arrangement. 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 As a result of this research effort, the researchers have identified some areas for 
further research. First, if the USMC (EFV) goes with a CFE arrangement and the US 
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Navy (LPD 17) procures the MK-44 under a GFE arrangement, GD will be the 
configuration manager for the USMC, while the Navy will manage their configuration in-
house. As EFV’s become cargo for the LPD 17, the potential for MK-44 parts to be 
interchanged does exist.  In the event of an accident as a result of parts being 
interchanged or accountability and maintainability with interchangeable parts, the 
investigation process could become intertwined with two different configuration 
managers.  
The second item for further research is the establishment of a service wide 
overhead rate to be used for A-76 studies to determine an appropriate opportunity cost for 
the Government.  The A-76 documentation used for research promulgated the concept of 
using a 12% overhead rate across the board (DoD wide).  However, the A-76 regulation 
further stipulated that each service is authorized to develop its own justifiable estimate 
for an overhead rate.  Thus far, there does not seem to be any evidence that the USMC 
has established such a figure. 
The third issue for further research would be to determine the plausible benefit to 
the DoD of establishing a medium caliber weapon system Program Manager to 
consolidate and procure all medium caliber requirements.  Our research seems to indicate 
a requirement from across the services for medium caliber weaponry.  One of our 
considerations was the ability of the Government to establish EOS with a selected 
contractor based on high volume requirements.  A medium caliber program office may be 
able to take advantage of EOS more readily than individual programs.  This would not be 
unprecedented.  There are small caliber and artillery/tank program offices to consolidate 
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APPENDIX A: HISTORY OF BURDEN RATES 
Jul-01       
WBS/CES Description Unique ID Forecast Equation / Throughput 
** GDAMS MAKE/BUY **     
Material Burden matlBurden 138.97% 
((1+OH) * (1+G&A) * 
(1+Fee)  + (1+OH) * 
(1*COM)) 
Material Burden for items exceeding $100,000 matlBurdenEx 117.42% ((1+G&AEx) * (1+Fee)) 
Material Overhead GDAMSMOH 4.37% 0.0437 
Cost of Money GDAMSCOM 0.97% 0.0097 
Material Related Overhead Rate OH 8.00% 0.08 
G&A Rate G&A 12.00% 0.12 
G&A Rate on items over $100k G&AEx 3.00% 0.03 
Profit Percentage Fee 14.00% 0.14 
Cost of Money COM 1.00% 0.01 
Other Direct Costs Rate ODC 106.45% 1 
      
WBS/CES Description Unique ID Forecast Equation / Throughput 
                Primary Weapon (Cannon)  $201,126.76   
                    MK44 Cannon Mod 1  $186,381.00   
                    30MM Gun Control UnitMK44 Cannon Mod 1 $9,700.00   
                    Borescope  $518.00   
                    Rod, Section, Cleaning  $16.50   
                    Rod, Section, Cleaning  $14.66   
                    Handle Assembly  $62.88   
                    Handl Control Unit  $4,433.72   
                Integral Gun Mount  $21,169.60   
                Secondary Weapon (Coaxial Machine Gun)    
                    M240 (7.62MM)  $5,344.00   
                Support Equipment  $0.00   
                Special Tools     
      
Jul-02     
WBS/CES Description Unique ID Forecast Equation / Throughput 
** GDAMS MAKE/BUY **     
Material Burden matlBurden 139.00% 
((1+MRO) * (1+G&A) 
* (1+Fee)  + (1+MRO) 
* (1*COM)) 
Material Burden for items exceeding $100,000 matlBurdenEx 117.00% ((1+G&AEx) * (1+Fee)) 
Material Burden on GFE matlBurdenGFE 11.00% 0.11 
      
Cost of Money GDAMSCOM 1.00% 0.01 
      
Material Related Overhead Rate MRO 8.00% 0.08 
G&A Rate G&A 12.00% 0.1192 
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MAEI-Major End-Item Rate ($100k) G&AEx 3.00% 0.03 
Profit Percentage Fee 14.00% 0.14 
Cost of Money COM 1.00% 0.0097 
      
    ARMAMENT (P) GFE  $209,599.67   
        Primary Weapon (Cannon) Cannon $197,959.41   
            MK44 Cannon Mod 1  $183,445.87 [Cost Throughput] 
            30MM Gun Control UnitMK44 Cannon Mod 1 $9,547.24 [Cost Throughput] 
            Borescope  $509.84 [Cost Throughput] 
            Rod, Section, Cleaning  $16.24 [Cost Throughput] 
            Rod, Section, Cleaning  $14.43 [Cost Throughput] 
            Handle Assembly  $61.89 [Cost Throughput] 
            Handl Control Unit  $4,363.90 [Cost Throughput] 
        Support Equipment  $3,552.95 [Cost Throughput] 
        Special Tools  $2,827.46 [Cost Throughput] 
      
      
Dec-02     
WBS/CES Description Unique ID Forecast Equation / Throughput 
** GDAMS MAKE/BUY **     
Material Burden matlBurden 139.00% 
((1+MRO) * (1+G&A) 
* (1+Fee)  + (1+MRO) 
* (1*COM)) 
Material Burden for items exceeding $100,000 matlBurdenEx 117.00% ((1+G&AEx) * (1+Fee)) 
Material Burden on GFE matlBurdenGFE 11.00% 0.11 
      
Cost of Money GDAMSCOM 1.00% 0.01 
Computer Rate Computer 1268.00% 12.68 
      
Material Related Overhead Rate MRO 8.00% 0.08 
G&A Rate G&A 12.00% 0.1192 
MAEI-Major End-Item Rate ($100k) G&AEx 3.00% 0.03 
Profit Percentage Fee 14.00% 0.14 
Cost of Money COM 1.00% 0.0097 
% Direct which is Support Hours SH 30.00% 0.3 
Other Direct Costs Rate ODC 107.00% 1 
      
    ARMAMENT (P) GFE  $189,546.85   
        Primary Weapon (Cannon) Cannon $182,884.09   
            MK44 Cannon Mod 1  $182,884.09 [Cost Throughput] 
      
      
      
      
Jul-03     
WBS/CES Description Unique ID Forecast Equation / Throughput 
** GDAMS MAKE/BUY **     
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Material Burden matlBurden 139.00% 
((1+MRO) * (1+G&A) 
* (1+Fee)  + (1+MRO) 
* (1*COM)) 
Material Burden for items exceeding $100,000 matlBurdenEx 117.00% ((1+G&AEx) * (1+Fee)) 
Material Burden on GFE matlBurdenGFE 11.00% 0.11 
      
Cost of Money GDAMSCOM 1.00% 0.01 
Material Related Overhead Rate MRO 8.00% 0.08 
G&A Rate G&A 12.00% 0.1192 
MAEI-Major End-Item Rate ($100k) G&AEx 3.00% 0.03 
Profit Percentage Fee 14.00% 0.14 
Cost of Money COM 1.00% 0.0097 
Other Direct Costs Rate ODC 107.00% 1 
      
    ARMAMENT (P) GFE  $189,606.34   
        Primary Weapon (Cannon) Cannon $182,884.09   
            MK44 Cannon Mod 1  $182,884.09   
      
Dec-03     
WBS/CES Description Unique ID Forecast Equation / Throughput 
** GDAMS MAKE/BUY **     
Material Burden matlBurden 134.00% 
((1+MRO) * (1+G&A) 
* (1+Fee)  + (1+MRO) 
* (1*COM)) 
Material Burden for items exceeding $100,000 matlBurdenEx 116.00% ((1+G&AEx) * (1+Fee)) 
Material Burden on GFE matlBurdenGFE 8.00% 0.0806 
      
Cost of Money GDAMSCOM 1.00% 0.0053 
Material Related Overhead Rate MRO 8.00% 0.0799 
G&A Rate G&A 8.00% 0.0806 
MAEI-Major End-Item Rate ($100k) G&AEx 2.00% 0.0208 
Profit Percentage Fee 14.00% 0.14 
Cost of Money COM 1.00% 0.0053 
Other Direct Costs Rate ODC 107.00% 1 
      
    ARMAMENT (P) GFE  $189,606.34   
        Primary Weapon (Cannon) Cannon $182,884.09   
            MK44 Cannon Mod 1  $182,884.09 [Cost Throughput] 
      
      
May-04     
WBS/CES Description Unique ID Forecast Equation / Throughput 
** GDAMS MAKE/BUY **     
Material Burden matlBurden 132.70% 
((1+MRO) * (1+G&A) 
* (1+Fee)  + (1+MRO) 
* (1*COM)) 
Material Burden for items exceeding $100,000 matlBurdenEx 116.30% ((1+G&AEx) * (1+Fee)) 
Material Burden on GFE matlBurdenGFE 7.00% 0.0698 
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Cost of Money GDAMSCOM 0.50% 0.0053 
      
Material Related Overhead Rate MRO 8.00% 0.0799 
G&A Rate G&A 7.30% 0.07322 
MAEI-Major End-Item Rate ($100k) G&AEx 2.00% 0.02016 
Profit Percentage Fee 14.00% 0.14 
Cost of Money COM 0.50% 0.0053 
Other Direct Costs Rate ODC 106.90% 1 
      
    ARMAMENT (P) GFE  $189,606.34   
        Primary Weapon (Cannon) Cannon $182,884.09   




APPENDIX B: GENERAL DYNAMICS MATERIAL BURDEN 
RATES 
                      
GFE Actuals N/A Estimated 
Cost burden 
factor CY99 CY00 CY01 CY02 CY03 CY04 CY05 CY06 CY07 CY08
                      
Unit cost 
more than 
$100,000 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 N/A 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
             
GD Supply Actuals N/A Estimated 
Cost burden 
factor CY99 CY00 CY01 CY02 CY03 CY04 CY05 CY06 CY07 CY08
                      
Unit cost 
more than 
$100,000 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 N/A 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
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• Is the procurement and integration of the MK-44 more 
advantageous to the Government under a GFE or CFE 
arrangement?
– Assumed a default position of GFE arrangement









1. The MK-44 is a potential CFE item.
2. CFE is similar to paying an “insurance 
premium”. 
3. CFE must be a value-added 
arrangement to justify the premium.
4. Subjective considerations must be 





• MK-44 as CFE
– MK-44 Unit Cost
• $212,163 used for 
analysis
– GDLS Profit Rate
• 14% used for analysis
– GDLS G&AEx Rate
• 2% used for analysis
• MK-44 as GFE
– MK-44 Unit Cost
• $186,541 used for 
analysis
– GDLS Burden Rate
• 2% used for analysis
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• MK-44 is 2% of EFV 
Unit Cost 
– EFV unit cost is 
estimated $7-10M; we 
used $8.5M
– GFE MK-44 unit cost 
of $186,541









CFE Cost in Context
• 14% Premium to GDLS
– $25,600 per MK-44
– .3% of EFV Unit Cost
• Program Cost (FY04 $)
– 935 EFV’s
• $7.95B Acq Cost
– 935 MK-44’s
• $23.9M CFE Acq Premium
















– Accepted risk is dependent on contract 
language and negotiation
– Integration and configuration risk
– Management effort required vs. personnel 
capabilities
– Infrastructure and funding support




Mitigation of Risk Factors
• GFE
– Contract Language - (i.e., JSF, ACA)
– IPT Management teams of GFE item
– Clearly define role of personnel







– No value-added processes
• Pass through fee
– Lose direct relations with ATK; intangibles





Mitigation of Risk Factors
• CFE
– Need to ensure the value-added is worth the 
price of the CFE premium
– Need to hold the Prime accountable by being 
proactive 





Characteristics of CFE and 
GFE Items
• CFE
– Low technical risk
– Low cost
– Sole source item
– Prime provides value-
added processes for 
integration





– High technical risk
– High cost
– High visibility 
– Ability to compete 
requirement/negotiate
– Prime does not 
perform value-added 
processes





Where does the MK-44 fall?
• MK-44
– Low technical risk item 
– Low cost (relative to total cost of EFV)
– Sole source item; no requirement for competition
– GDLS will provide value-added processes…
• By integrating the MK-44 with the turret
• By acting as configuration manager
• Potentially achieving EOS on future MK-44 buys
– MK-44 is a reliable, proven product
– ATK is reputable business with a mature production 






• Opportunity Cost of EFV Program 
employees under a GFE arrangement 
– DoD guidance (A-76) for outsourcing 
determination





• Configuration issue with Navy GFE (LPD)
– Potential issue (outside scope of project)
• Economies of Scale (EOS)
– Potential unit price reduction
– Dependent on future unknown contracts







– GFE requires 
meticulous, systematic 
risk management plan
– CFE provides flexibility
• Config changes
• Mod timeliness
– CFE requires adept 
KO
– ATK a good sub-
contractor
• JSF Program:
– Contractors don’t have 
“system view”
– IPT leads belong to 
prime contractor
– GFE requires adept 
KO






• Primary: Is the procurement and integration of the 
MK-44 more advantageous to the Government under a 
GFE or CFE arrangement?
• Secondary: What cost drivers are critical to an 
equitable comparison between a GFE and CFE 
arrangement?
• What risk factors are critical to a GFE or CFE 
analysis?
• What acquisition, market or economic conditions 
cause one arrangement to be preferred to the other?
• What are the possible methods of analyzing 








1. The MK-44 is a potential CFE item.
2. CFE is similar to paying an “insurance 
premium”. 
3. CFE must be a value-added 
arrangement to justify the premium.
4. Subjective considerations must be 
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